Forgot your password?
Cyhist Jul 5 1996 B
Document Actions
Sender: Coop Subject: Re: CM> Origins of the word "ghost in the machine."
At 11:32 PM 7/5/96 -0700, Hari Kunzru wrote:
>. . ., though I have a vague memory that the phrase might have been
>coined by an Oxford philosopher writing a critique of Descartes slightly
>earlier than Koestler's book.
>
I think the philosopher you have in mind is Gilbert Ryle. Ryle was perhaps
one of the most interesting of the Oxford types- writing predominately in
response to issues raised by the perennial "mind-body" problem. His views-
although anti-cognitivist- revealed a profound sympathy for Cartesian reasoning.
If your interested, pick up a copy of:
Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson & Company.
An example of his anti-cognitivist line of thinking follows:
According to the legend, whenever an agent does anything intelligently,
his act is preceded and steered by another internal act of considering a
regulative proposition appropriate to his practical problem. [...] Must we
then say that for the hero's reflections how to act to be intelligent he must
first reflect how best to reflect how to act? The endlessness of this implied
regress shows that the application of the appropriateness does not entail the
occurrence of a process of considering this criterion. (from p.31 of the
above)
Randolph Cooper
______________________________________________________________________
At 11:32 PM 7/5/96 -0700, Hari Kunzru wrote:
>. . ., though I have a vague memory that the phrase might have been
>coined by an Oxford philosopher writing a critique of Descartes slightly
>earlier than Koestler's book.
>
I think the philosopher you have in mind is Gilbert Ryle. Ryle was perhaps
one of the most interesting of the Oxford types- writing predominately in
response to issues raised by the perennial "mind-body" problem. His views-
although anti-cognitivist- revealed a profound sympathy for Cartesian reasoning.
If your interested, pick up a copy of:
Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson & Company.
An example of his anti-cognitivist line of thinking follows:
According to the legend, whenever an agent does anything intelligently,
his act is preceded and steered by another internal act of considering a
regulative proposition appropriate to his practical problem. [...] Must we
then say that for the hero's reflections how to act to be intelligent he must
first reflect how best to reflect how to act? The endlessness of this implied
regress shows that the application of the appropriateness does not entail the
occurrence of a process of considering this criterion. (from p.31 of the
above)
Randolph Cooper
______________________________________________________________________
